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Abstract: This article argues that diverse theorists have reasons to theorize about fairness in 
nonideal conditions, including theorists who reject fairness in ideal theory. It then develops 
a new all-purpose model of ‘nonideal fairness.’ §1 argues that fairness is central to nonideal 
theory across diverse ideological and methodological frameworks. §2 then argues that 
‘nonideal fairness’ is best modeled by a nonideal original position adaptable to different 
nonideal conditions and background normative frameworks (including anti-Rawlsian ones). 
§3 then argues that the parties to the model have grounds to seek a variety of remedial social, 
legal, cultural, and economic ‘nonideal primary goods’ for combating injustice, as well as 
grounds to distribute these goods in an equitable and inclusive manner. Finally, I illustrate 
how the model indexes the nonideal primary goods it justifies to different nonideal contexts 
and background normative frameworks, illustrating why diverse theorists should find the 
model and its output principles attractive. 
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Moral, social, and political theorists have increasingly focused on the distinction between 
ideal and nonideal theory, for good reason. First, it is vital to determine whether we should 
theorize about ideals—as many allege ideal theorizing is inherently problematic (Farrelly 
2007; Mills 2005; Sen 2009; Wiens 2015. Cf. Lawford-Smith 2010; Simmons 2010; Erman 
and Möller 2013; Volacu 2017). Second, if ideal theorizing should be done, there are 
questions of how to do it properly and distinguish it from nonideal theory (Rawls 1999a: 4-
5, 215-7; Stemplowska 2008; Simmons 2010; Valentini 2012; Volacu 2017). Third, there is 
the issue of how to extend ideal theories to nonideal conditions, both generally (Arvan 2008, 
2014; Mills 2017: 201-16; Phillips 1985; Simmons 2010; Volacu 2017) and for specific 
issues, such as affirmative action (Taylor 2009; Matthew 2015), reparations (Carcien 2009; 
Espindola and Vaca 2014), and warfare (Rawls 1999b: Part II). Finally, if ideal theorizing 
should not be pursued, there is the question of how to theorize properly without it (Sen 
2009; Wiens 2012).  
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Although substantial progress has been made on these questions, this article argues 
that two issues remain underexplored: the extent to which fairness should be central to 
nonideal theorizing, and how to theorize about ‘nonideal fairness’ properly. This article 
argues that diverse theorists have reasons to theorize about nonideal fairness. It then 
defends a new all-purpose framework for determining what nonideal fairness requires.  
§1 argues that fairness is central to nonideal theory across diverse ideological and 
methodological frameworks. First, §1.1 argues that fairness is central to Rawlsian nonideal 
theory. §1.2 then argues that fairness remains central to nonideal theory for two very 
different ideologies: Nozickean libertarianism and Marxism. Here I show that although 
Nozick rejects fairness in ideal theory, he invokes it in nonideal theory—because only 
fairness appears capable of resolving conflicts in his theory of rectification. I then show that 
an analogous point extends to Marxism. Finally, §1.3 argues the point extends to the 
‘nonideal-theory-only’ approaches defended by Sen and Wiens. Although §1 only addresses 
a handful of theoretical frameworks, I use them because they are influential, ideologically 
and methodologically diverse, and because they illustrate a general point: that nonideal 
conditions give rise to conflicting claims that fairness appears necessary to adequately 
resolve. Accordingly, although §1 does not establish that all theories of justice require an 
account of nonideal fairness, it shows that several diverse and influential frameworks do; 
that nonideal fairness has been undertheorized across those frameworks; and that there are 
general reasons to think this may be true of other (if not all1) normative frameworks. 
                                                          
1 As one reviewer noted, utilitarianism is a plausible counterexample: whether it supports ‘nonideal fairness’ 
depends on what maximizes utility. Although this is true, Rawls’ influential objection to utilitarianism—that it 
fails to respect the ‘separateness of persons’ (Rawls 1999a: 23, 163)—may be instructive. One possibility worth 
examining is whether fairness is central to nonideal theory for any normative framework that adequately 
respects separateness of persons. However, we must set this aside for future inquiry.  
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 Next, §2 argues that a quasi-Rawlsian model of fairness applied to nonideal 
conditions—a generalized version of a ‘nonideal original position’ previously defended in a 
Rawlsian context—models a conception of nonideal fairness that diverse theorists should 
find attractive.2  
Finally, §3 explores principles of nonideal justice that might emerge from the model—
principles I suggest diverse theorists should find attractive as well. 
1. Fairness as Central to Nonideal Theory 
Some contend that justice is fairness, understanding justice in terms of substantive 
principles of fairness justified by a fair procedure (Rawls 1999a: §3; Dworkin 2002). 
However, not everyone does. Libertarians identify an ideally just order as respecting liberty 
(Nozick 1974: chs. 2-8, esp. 90-95), and classical utilitarians contend justice involves 
maximizing the good (Mill 1861: ch. V)—even though both arguably justify unfair treatment 
(Rawls 1999a: §5; Nozick 1974: chs. 7-8). Thus, justice and fairness may or may not be 
identical. Nevertheless, questions of procedural and substantive fairness loom large in 
nonideal contexts. For example, is affirmative action just? Proponents argue justice requires 
or permits it for ensuring fair outcomes (Appiah 2011; Beauchamp 1998; Burns and 
Schapper 2008) or fair selection-procedures (Harris and Narayan 1994). However, 
opponents allege it is an unfair procedure of reverse discrimination (Pojman 1998; Taylor 
2009; Mulligan 2017). Is universal health care just? Proponents often argue fairness requires 
                                                          
2 Readers may note similarities to Mills’ (2017: Epilogue, esp. 213) suggestion that liberalism should utilize a 
modified Rawlsian model to address racial injustice. However, there are important differences between our 
projects. First, my project is broader, arguing that a modified Rawlsian model should be utilized by more 
diverse theorists, including libertarians, Marxists, and those who disagree with Mills’ (1997, 2005) critiques of 
ideal theory. Second, the modified Rawlsian apparatus defended here is a generalized form of the model 
previously defended in Arvan (2008, 2014), where I argue it has different implications for racial justice than 
Mills (2017: 214-5) suggests. 
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it (Daniels 1995; Dworkin 1993), others disagree (Jacobs 1996). What about reparations for 
historical injustice? Proponents often argue fairness substantively requires reparations 
(Carcien 2010; Espindola and Vaca 2014; Coates 2014). However, opponents allege 
reparations are an unfair procedure harming the innocent (Horowitz 2001). And world 
poverty? Some argue fairness requires a lot from people to alleviate it (Singer 1972); others 
are less certain (Arvan 2016: 194-6; Wenar 2003).  
I will not argue here that fairness is the only normative issue in nonideal theory (Cf. 
Arvan 2016). The relevant point is that fairness is normatively central to debates about 
justice in a nonideal world. We will now see there are good reasons why. 
1.1 Fairness in Rawlsian Nonideal Theory 
Given that Rawls holds that justice is fairness, fairness is surely central to Rawlsian nonideal 
theory. What is less well-understood is what Rawlsians should take ‘nonideal fairness’ to be. 
Some contend that Rawls’ principles of ideal justice should be extended to nonideal 
conditions ‘in spirit’ (Korsgaard 1996: 147–51; Taylor 2009). Further, some who presuppose 
this approach suggest that nonideal theory cannot save Rawls’ ideal theory from common 
critiques (Kang 2016). These views, however, are mistaken. As Simmons (2010: §3) and I 
(Arvan 2014: 97-101) argue, Rawls’ ideal theory cannot be extended to nonideal conditions 
straightforwardly—but when it is extended properly it can address issues not addressed 
adequately in ideal theory, including (contra Kang) affording extra concern for the interests 
of marginalized groups (Arvan 2014: 114-5). Allow me to explain. 
In Arvan (2014), I argued that because Rawls assumes ‘strict-compliance’ in ideal 
theory, Rawlsian ideal theory generates no account of what fairness requires under nonideal 
conditions. Rawls recognized this lacuna, writing: 
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It will be recalled that strict compliance is one of the stipulations to the original 
position…Because the parties are choosing a conception of justice suitable for 
favorable conditions…the principles [of justice] define then a perfectly just 
scheme…But even granting the soundness of these principles for this purpose, we 
must still ask how well they apply to institutions under less than favorable conditions, 
and whether they provide any guidance for instances of injustice. The principles and 
their lexical order were not acknowledged with these situations in mind and so it is 
possible that they no longer hold (Rawls 1999a: 215-6; emphasis added).  
Specifically, in his theory of domestic justice, Rawls has the parties to the original position 
assume theirs is ‘a society in which (1) everyone accepts and knows that others accept the 
same principles of justice, and (2) the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are 
known to satisfy these principles’ (Ibid: 4). Simmons (2010: 17) shows this assumption 
entails two possible types of domestic non-compliance: non-compliance by individuals and 
by institutions. To see how Rawlsian ideal theory thus fails to provide an analysis of nonideal 
fairness, consider one case of institutional non-compliance: the present-day USA. The US fails 
to strictly-comply with Rawls’ first principle of ideal justice. For although the US Constitution 
nominally ascribes equal basic rights and liberties to all citizens—in conformity with Rawls’ 
first principle—the US fails to satisfy that principle’s requirement that everyone enjoy the 
‘fair value’ of those rights and liberties (Rawls 1993: 358; Rawls 2001: 149. See also 
Krishnamurthy 2012, 2013). Some ways the US plausibly fails to do so include voter 
suppression (Bentele and O’Brien 2013) and evisceration of the Fourth Amendment for 
minority populations (Alexander 2012: ch. 2).  The US also fails to satisfy Rawls’ fair-
equality-of-opportunity principle, which plausibly prohibits (Rawls 1999b: 63, 245) the US’s 
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vast disparities by race and ethnicity in education (Mickelson 2003), health-care (Williams 
and Jackson 2005), incarceration (Pettit and Western 2004), and so on. Finally, the US fails 
to satisfy Rawls’ (1999a: 65-8) difference principle, which prohibits economic inequalities 
not to the advantage of all, particularly the least well-off—as economic inequality in the US 
primarily benefits the top 1% (Piketty and Saez 2006). 
 None of this is surprising. If Rawls’ ideal theory of domestic justice is correct, the 
United States must change substantially to become fully just. But at what cost, and to whom? 
Consider one attempt to arguably move closer to Rawls’ ideal of fair equality of opportunity: 
the Affordable Care Act of 2010, the nominal aim of which is to ensure all Americans have 
access to affordable health care. Suppose the ACA brought the US closer to Rawlsian ideals. 
Regardless, transition to the ACA imposed costs on people that would never arise in an ideal 
Rawlsian society. Among other things, businesses and insurance companies had to take on 
costs of unhealthy individuals who might have been healthier if the US had a just health care 
system from the outset (see Kocher and Adashi 2011). The point here is simple: nonideal 
conditions generate ‘nonideal costs’ that would never arise under ideal conditions—costs of 
injustice and costs of reform.  
This is critical. Because of Rawls’ strict-compliance assumption, the parties to his 
ideal original position never considered any such costs, including costs from individual non-
compliance. Consequently, if justice is fairness (as Rawls contends), Rawlsians still need to 
provide some further account of nonideal fairness factoring in nonideal costs. Finally, 
because Rawls (1999b: 3) similarly predicates his Law of Peoples on strict-compliance, 
Rawlsians need a theory of nonideal fairness for international affairs as well (Simmons 2010: 
17; Cf. Arvan 2008). 
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1.2 Fairness in Non-Rawlsian Nonideal Theory 
This article cannot examine every ideological perspective. Instead, let us examine two deeply 
opposed ideologies: Nozickean libertarianism and Marxism. As we will now see, both also 
generate clear reasons to theorize about nonideal fairness, in ways not yet fully recognized. 
Along with Rawlsianism, I use these test-cases to illustrate that across diverse and opposing 
ideologies, nonideal conditions give rise to conflicting claims that fairness appears necessary 
to adequately resolve. 
 Let us begin with Robert Nozick’s libertarian theory. Nozick (1974: 28-34) defends 
negative rights to life, liberty, and property as moral ‘side-constraints’ that cannot be 
permissibly violated even for protecting the same rights of others. He then argues that only 
a ‘minimal’ libertarian state respects these constraints (Ibid: chs. 4-9). Throughout, Nozick 
inveighs against the idea that justice is a matter of fairness, at least in ideal theory. First, he 
argues against fair play—the notion (see Hart 1955; Rawls 1964) that persons benefitting 
from mutually advantageous cooperative ventures (such as a nation-state) owe 
acquiescence to the venture’s rules as a matter of fairness. Second, Nozick (1974: ch. 7) 
argues against a ‘fair distribution’ of wealth and income, contending that justice requires 
respect for individual property-rights. Finally, Nozick argues against entitlements to fair 
equality of opportunity, meaningful work, and non-exploitation (Ibid: ch. 8). Given Nozick’s 
systematic opposition to fairness in ideal theory, why should a Nozickean ascribe normative 
force to fairness in nonideal theory? 
 The answer, surprisingly, is in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. First, on the few occasions 
that Nozick discusses nonideal theory, considerations of fairness are prominent. Consider 
Nozick’s answer to what justice requires in rectifying historical injustice. Nozick claims we 
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should reason counterfactually, asking which property-holdings individuals would have if 
injustice never occurred (Ibid: 152-3). However, Nozick then adds: 
[W]hatever difficulties [one] has in applying the principle of rectification to persons 
who did not violate the first two principles [of the entitlement theory of justice] are 
difficulties in balancing considerations so as to correctly formulate the complex 
principle itself; ... (Ibid: 173). 
If ‘balancing considerations’ sounds like fairness, that is because it is. Later, Nozick argues 
that because we cannot determinately trace out the effects of historically-distant injustices 
(e.g. we cannot know precisely which individual(s) would hold this land had Native Peoples 
never been defrauded), we must appeal to some other normative notion beyond respect for 
liberty. And that notion? Nozick writes: 
Perhaps it is best to view some patterned principles of distributive justice as rough 
rules of thumb meant to approximate the general results of applying the principle of 
rectification…For example, lacking much historical information, and assuming (1) 
that victims of injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would and (2) that 
those from the least well-off group…have the highest probability of being the 
(descendants of) victims…then a rough rule of thumb for rectifying injustices might 
seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position of whatever 
group ends up least well-off in society….Although to introduce socialism as the 
punishment for our sins would be to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to 
make necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them (Ibid: 
230-1, emphases added). 
9 
 
In essence, Nozick holds that when we lack sufficient information to rectify past injustices 
counterfactually (viz. respect for individual liberty), we must appeal to fairness, instituting 
something like Rawls’ difference principle because it seems like the fairest thing to do. 
Fairness also seems implicit in Nozick’s addendum that socialism ‘would go too far.’ Why 
would it ‘go too far’?  What answer can Nozick plausibly give here except, ‘That amount of 
infringement of liberty would be unfair’? 
 Second, by investigating the normative foundations Nozick gives for libertarianism, 
we can see there are independent reasons to think he must invoke fairness in nonideal 
conditions. Nozick gives two justifications for libertarian side-constraints. First, Nozick 
(1974: 32) suggests that they are perhaps the best interpretation of the Kant’s (1785: 4:429) 
requirement to never treat humanity as a mere means (Cf. Rawls 1999a: §40). Nozick’s   
second justification focuses on our ability to plan our lives and pursue our ends. He contends 
that insofar as these things enable us to make our lives meaningful (Nozick 1974: 48-51), 
and we care about living meaningful lives—not merely pleasant ones (Ibid: 42-5)—we have 
moral grounds to treat liberty as a side-constraint. 
 We can see how both rationales apply to Nozick’s (Ibid: 93-4) public address example 
against fair play. Nozick asks whether, even if you enjoyed others playing a public address 
system, justice permits others to coerce you to play it on ‘your’ assigned day. Nozick claims 
this would be unjust, as it would deprive you of your liberty (Ibid: 94-5). Regardless of 
whether we agree, we can see how Nozick’s two rationales for libertarian side-constraints 
apply: forcing you to play the address system would in his view use you as a mere means for 
others, making you spend one day of your life doing something you do not find meaningful.  
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 However, can Nozick’s normative rationales coherently justify libertarian side-
constraints in nonideal conditions? It is hard to see how. Consider slavery or historical 
injustices toward Native Peoples, the downstream effects of which are still pervasive.3 For 
Nozick, historical injustices invalidate any resulting distribution of property-holdings. For 
example, if someone’s ancestor was unjustly deprived of this land, then for Nozick no one 
other than the original holder or their descendants is morally entitled to it. Here, though, is 
the problem. If we do not know who would have been entitled to this land had no injustice 
occurred, then Nozick’s counterfactual account of rectification cannot specify who is now 
entitled to it. On the one hand, some people (descendants of Native Peoples, slaves, etc.) 
remain disadvantaged by historical injustice, compromising their ability to freely pursue 
their life plans in ways that (for all we know) they might be counterfactually entitled to. On 
the other hand, taking land or property away from you or I would interfere without our 
autonomy and life plans in ways we may be counterfactually entitled to. Because in cases of 
distant injustice we cannot know precisely who is counterfactually entitled to what, Nozick’s 
principle of rectification—his account of what respect for liberty requires in rectifying 
injustice—cannot specify what nonideal justice requires. But if liberty cannot settle this, 
what can?  As Nozick’s own discussion reveals, only some notion of fairness—some notion 
of how much liberty it is fair for people to sacrifice to rectify distant injustices—appears 
capable of specifying which forms of rectification ‘go too far’ and which do not. 
Now consider Communism—the Marxist notion that an ideal, non-exploitive society 
would conform to the dictum ‘from each according to their ability, to each according to their 
                                                          
3 See my discussion earlier regarding systemic inequalities of basic liberties, opportunities, and income in the 
US, at least some of which surely reflect historical injustice on Nozick’s libertarian picture. 
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need’ (Marx 1891). Although Marx’s theory of history (‘dialectical materialism’) holds that 
Communism must be achieved through a proletarian revolution, Marxism still implies an 
‘ideal theory’ of sorts. After all, Marx’s complaint against all non-Communist systems is that 
they are unfairly exploitive (Ibid.; Marx and Engels 1848; Cf. Elster 1978). Insofar as Marx 
argues that Communism is normatively superior to other social-political systems, Marxism 
implies that Communism is ideal. 
We can now see in turn why Marxists should theorize about ‘nonideal fairness.’ One 
reason is the astonishing unfairness and brutality of past and present ‘communist’ 
movements, such as mass murder and starvation in Soviet Russia following the Bolshevik 
Revolution (Rappaport 1999: 53), the great famine resulting from Mao’s Great Leap Forward 
(Song 2010), and so on. Of course, many might contend that Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism 
misinterpreted or misapplied Marxism. However, this does not obviate the need for a theory 
of nonideal fairness for Marxists, for two reasons. First, because different interpretations of 
Marxism can be held and have been pursued at great human cost, a nonideal theory of 
fairness for those interpretations might have helped to prevent immense atrocities—by 
getting Leninists, Maoists, etc., to understand that their ideals do not justify any and every 
means for achieving them. Second, Marx’s own theory of a proletarian revolution lacks an 
adequate account of the costs people should face in transition to Communism. Given Marx’s 
normative opposition to unfair exploitation, moral consistency requires applying the same 
standard to transition: a Marxist conception of ‘nonideal fairness’ (which I explore in §3). 
Thus, across diverse frameworks—Rawlsianism, Nozickean libertarianism, and 
Marxism—we observe similar issues. First, because each framework’s ideals abstract away 
from ‘nonideal costs’, each tradition needs to provide a normatively coherent and plausible 
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account of how nonideal costs should be addressed. Second, we have seen that on all three 
frameworks, only fairness appears capable of fulfilling this role—because ‘nonideal costs’ 
give rise to conflicting claims that other notions (like liberty) appear normatively insufficient 
to resolve. Finally, we can see how the argument plausibly extends to other ideal theories. 
Insofar as ideal theories focus on ideal conditions—abstracting away from nonideal costs 
and conflicting claims they generate—normatively forceful questions about nonideal 
fairness seem likely arise relative to other ideal theories as well.  
1.3 Fairness in Nonideal-Theory-Only Frameworks 
Similar issues arise even for ‘nonideal-theory-only’ approaches to social and political theory. 
For example, Amartya Sen (2009) argues for reasoning about justice using comparative 
judgments, normatively evaluating actions and institutions based on their effects on human 
capabilities. Similarly, Wiens (2012) argues for focusing on institutional failure analysis—
that is, on ways institutions generate problematic social outcomes, and ways to correct such 
failures. However, these accounts also need some further account of nonideal fairness. 
To see how, suppose we judge the current US health-care system to be comparatively 
worse than universal health-care (qua Sen), perhaps because current institutions generate 
problematic outcomes (qua Wiens). Nevertheless, any transition to a system of universal 
health-care is going to impose costs on people, such as shifting tax burdens, putting 
insurance companies out of business, insurance adjusters out of jobs, etc. These costs raise 
questions of fairness not adequately addressed by Sen’s or Wiens’ methods. First, there are 
questions of fairness in weighing ‘comparatively better states of affairs’ or ‘better 
institutions’ against transition-costs. Second, there are questions of fairness in 
distribution—of how transition-costs should be distributed across individuals, groups, or 
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nations in social reform. Consequently, nonideal-theory-only theorists also need a further 
theory of nonideal fairness: a theory of the costs it is fair to impose upon people for bringing 
about a comparatively better world. 
2. Nonideal Justice as Nonideal Fairness 
We have seen that diverse theoretical traditions need an account of nonideal fairness. 
Nonideal conditions give rise to ‘nonideal costs’—to conflicting claims inadequately 
addressed in ideal theory or by standard ‘nonideal-theory-only’ methods—that fairness 
appears normatively necessary to resolve. However, what would a compelling analysis of 
nonideal fairness look like?  
Such an analysis intuitively needs to do several things. First, it should hold everyone 
in nonideal conditions to whichever duties of justice we might conditionally establish prior 
to factoring ‘nonideal costs.’ Such duties may be specified in two ways. First, they might be 
specified by ideal theory. As we have seen, ideal theories define ideal conditions by 
abstracting away from nonideal costs: Rawls derives his principles of ideal justice from an 
assumption of strict-compliance; Nozick derives his ideal libertarian state from the 
assumption that libertarian side-constraints are never violated; and so on. Because ideal 
theories abstract away from nonideal costs, they at most establish conditional duties—
duties to bring about ideal conditions (relative to whichever ideal theory is assumed) all 
things being equal. Alternatively, if ideal theory is rejected, conditional duties may be arrived 
at through ‘nonideal-theory-only’ methods—for instance, through Sen’s method of 
comparative evaluation or Wiens’ institutional-failure analysis. However, as we saw in §1.3, 
these methods also only establish conditional duties of justice. Sen’s method at most 
specifies which end-states would be comparatively more just (abstracting away from 
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transition-costs), and Wiens’ method only tells us which institutions are failing and which 
institutions might work better (not which transition-costs are fair to impose upon people). 
Consequently, a good model of nonideal fairness should not only include or ‘plug in’ 
whichever conditional duties of justice are established by other methods. It should also (i) 
model a fair procedure for, (ii) weighing such conditional duties against ‘nonideal costs’, and 
for (iii) justifying substantive conclusions about what fairness requires in nonideal conditions 
taking these matters into consideration.  
Such a model, if constructed, would appear to comprise a compelling all-purpose 
analysis of nonideal fairness for two reasons: 
1. It could be fruitfully attached to a diverse variety of ideological or methodological 
frameworks, inserting whichever conditional duties one’s favored theoretical 
framework affirms. 
2. It would constitute a fair procedure for arriving at substantive principles of nonideal 
fairness on two critical issues we have seen other frameworks elide: (i) fairness in 
weighing conditional duties of justice against nonideal costs (and, by extension, 
weighing nonideal costs against each other), and (ii) fairness in distributing nonideal 
costs in social reform. 
Can we construct such a model? In Arvan (2014), I argued that a variant of Rawls’ original 
position—a ‘nonideal original position’—does just this. Although I only developed the model 
in a Rawlsian context, we will now see that it can be generalized (Cf. Arvan 2008). For let us 
look at the model in detail.  
First, I proposed we imagine the parties to the nonideal original position as situated 
behind a ‘nonideal veil of ignorance’—a variant of Rawls’ veil of ignorance applied to 
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nonideal conditions instead of strict-compliance (Arvan 2014: 100-2). For example, in the 
case of Rawls’ theory of domestic justice, the relevant parties to the nonideal original 
position would be all citizens of a particular state (say, the US) behind a veil of ignorance 
applied to the conditions of noncompliance in their society (giving them general knowledge 
of its injustices). The nonideal veil of ignorance then withholds from the parties any self-
identifying information about which citizen (present or future) they might actually be. 
Consequently, the nonideal original position models a fair method whereby no relevant 
individuals can arbitrarily privilege themselves in nonideal conditions over anyone else. 
 Next, I proposed the parties behind the nonideal veil are to all have Rawlsian ideals 
as all-things-equal motivations (Ibid: 100-5). This models the fact that Rawlsian ideal theory 
(if correct) establishes ‘conditional’ duties of justice. Because, as we saw earlier, Rawlsian 
ideal theory entirely abstracts away from nonideal costs, everyone in the nonideal original 
position ought to regard themselves under a duty to pursue Rawlsian ideals, but also as free 
to weigh those ideals against nonideal costs—since again, nothing in Rawlsian ideal theory 
addressed such costs (Ibid: 104-5). Thus formulated, the nonideal original position 
superficially appears to contain a contradiction (Ibid: 102, 104). Its parties are all stipulated 
to have Rawlsian ideals behind the veil, while deliberating as though they could turn out to 
be any actual individual in nonideal conditions. Because many actual individuals are not 
motivated by Rawlsian ideals, this seemingly implies the parties to the model all have motive 
X (Rawlsian ideals) but might not have X—an apparent inconsistency. However, this 
contradiction is illusory. Because the parties behind the veil are stipulated to deliberate from 
Rawlsian ideals, the model represents the commonsense idea that justice in a nonideal world 
requires holding everyone to their duties to pursue a more just world even if, in actuality, 
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they are not motivated to do so (Ibid: 104). Putting these two components together—the 
parties’ motives and the nonideal veil of ignorance—I argued that the model represents an 
important step forward in Rawlsian theory. It provides Rawlsians a fair procedure for 
weighing nonideal costs against Rawlsian ideals, and for distributing nonideal costs fairly. 
Non-Rawlsians might wonder why, if they reject Rawls’ original position in ideal 
theory, they should accept it as a model of fairness in nonideal theory.4 The answer, I will 
now argue, is that the nonideal original position represents an attractive model of nonideal 
fairness relative to diverse ideological and methodological commitments. For notice: the 
normative rationales for each component of the nonideal original position are perfectly 
general. The nonideal original position is a compelling model of nonideal fairness not 
because Rawls’ theoretical apparatus implies it, but because it accomplishes several things 
we should want any nonideal theory of fairness to do—namely: 
(A) Hold people normatively to whichever conditional duties of justice they have. 
(B) Provide a fair procedure for weighing nonideal costs against those conditional duties 
and against each other. 
(C) Provide a fair procedure for deliberating to substantive principles of fairness for 
distributing nonideal costs. 
We can see this by returning to anti-Rawlsian frameworks. For example, what should a 
Nozickean be looking for in nonideal theory? As we saw in §1.2, they should look to hold 
everyone to a duty to support libertarian ideals and a principle of rectification, but then give 
some principled analysis of which nonideal costs it is fair to impose upon people for 
rectifying historical wrongs. Now consider Marxism. What should a Marxist want in nonideal 
                                                          
4 I thank Laura Kane for pressing this concern. 
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theory? As we saw in §1.2, they should want to hold everyone in nonideal conditions to a 
duty to support Communism, while providing some principled analysis of which nonideal 
costs it is fair to impose upon people in transitioning toward Communism. And what sort of 
model should a ‘nonideal-theory-only’ theorist (e.g. Sen, Wiens, etc.) be looking for? As we 
saw in §1.3, they should look to hold people to duties to support comparatively more just 
conditions (qua Sen) or rectify institutional failures (qua Wiens), but then provide some 
principled analysis of nonideal costs it is fair to impose upon people in pursuit of these 
duties. In each case, these are the very questions the nonideal original position provides a 
fair procedure for addressing. Relative to whichever conditional duties one plugs into the 
model, the nonideal original position models a fair procedure for deliberating to substantive 
principles of nonideal fairness.5  
The nonideal original position is thus an all-purpose method for engaging in Volacu’s 
(2017) proposed process of ‘incremental derivation’ in nonideal theory. First, the model can 
be applied to any set of nonideal conditions—to Rawlsian Partial-Compliance Theory, 
Unfavorable Conditions Theory, or 'No-Circumstances-of-Justice Theory’ (see Arvan 2014: 
98-9); to Simmons’ various forms of noncompliance (Simmons 2010: 17); to unjust 
international conditions (Cf. Arvan 2008); to historical injustices (viz. Nozickean 
rectification); and so on. Second, it may be applied to specific issues within nonideal theory: 
to affirmative action, poverty, warfare, etc. Finally, as we have seen it can be applied using 
                                                          
5 Although in one sense the nonideal original position ‘idealizes’—modeling everyone under nonideal 
conditions in a position of fairness—that does not make it an ‘ideal theory.’ Any normative theory—including 
theories of how we should respond to a nonideal world—will have to idealize in some way, telling us what 
would be fair in a given set of conditions. The salient question, Volacu (2017) points out, is not whether a model 
idealizes but whether its idealizations accurately represent relevant normative considerations. The point of 
this article is that the nonideal original position correctly represents normative considerations relevant to 
determining what is fair in nonideal conditions. 
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different ideals (Nozickean ideals, Marxist ideals, etc.) or nonideal-theoretic methods (Sen’s 
comparative-justice analysis, Wiens’ institutional failure analysis, etc.). 
3. What Nonideal Fairness Might Be 
Which principles of nonideal fairness might emerge from the nonideal original position? The 
short answer is it seems likely to justify different principles for different nonideal 
conditions—as different conditions (e.g. injustice in modern democracies, injustices in slave 
states, warfare, etc.) pose different challenges and possibilities. However, there are prima 
facie reasons to think the principles it is likely to generate will have certain commonalities 
regardless of nonideal context or which conditional duties are utilized. 
 To see how, consider how in previous work I filled in the deliberative situation of the 
parties in the Rawlsian case. First, I argued (Arvan 2014: 101-8) that because ideal theory 
establishes conditional duties, and the veil of ignorance enables the parties to weigh those 
duties against nonideal costs, the parties have three higher-order interests behind the 
nonideal veil: 
1. Bringing people in nonideal conditions who oppose or are ambivalent to Rawlsian 
ideals to instead support and pursue those ideals—including the priority relations 
Rawls (1999a: 53-4) ascribes to his principles of ideal justice. 
2. Enabling everyone who has Rawlsian ideals to rationally weigh those ideals against 
nonideal costs (and nonideal costs against each other). 
3. Enabling everyone who rationally weighs Rawlsian ideals against nonideal costs to 
effectively advance their most favored weighting thereof. 
Although these higher-order interests could lead the parties to different principles of 
nonideal justice for different conditions (e.g. slavery, warfare, etc.), they reveal the parties 
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have similar deliberative concerns across nonideal contexts: promoting Rawlsian ideals, 
rationally weighing them against costs, etc. 
Notice, next, that these three interests are highly intuitive vis-à-vis what justice 
requires in a nonideal world. The first interest tells us that justice requires ‘changing the 
hearts and minds’ of people who lack the right ideals. Although in previous work I 
presupposed Rawlsian ideals, I need not have. If we were to build different ideals into the 
model (e.g. Nozickean ideals, Marxist ideals, etc.), the parties to it would have analogous 
interests relative to those other ideals: interests in changing people’s values in favor of 
whichever ideals (Rawlsian, Nozickean, Marxist, etc.) one takes to be correct. This 
implication of the model is highly intuitive: bringing people to support the right ideals has 
been the aim of (roughly) every reform movement in history. Now consider the second 
higher-order interest. It tells us that people in nonideal conditions have legitimate interests 
in rationally weighing ideals against nonideal costs, and nonideal costs against each other. 
This too is highly intuitive. Whether it be affirmative action, reparations, or warfare, one 
major point of debates about justice in a nonideal world is how people should weigh just 
end-results (e.g. reparations, fair equality of opportunity, etc.) against costs. Finally, the third 
interest tells us that nonideal justice involves enabling everyone who has the right ideals to 
have a (fair) say over the costs people should have to face for the sake of bringing about a 
better world. This is intuitive too, as fairness must take into account everyone’s legitimate 
interests, not arbitrarily privileging some people’s interests over others (though, as we will 
see, the parties may have fair grounds given the veil for favoring some people’s interests). 
 Here, then, is the key point: the same rationales for analogous higher-order interests 
exist relative to whichever normative framework we plug into the model (Nozickean 
20 
 
libertarianism, Marxism, ‘nonideal-theory-only’ frameworks, and so on). Given that, as we 
have seen, we can attach any of these normative frameworks to the model—let us call 
whichever theory is plugged-in Theory T—the higher-order interests the parties to any 
nonideal original position should have are these: 
1. Bringing people in nonideal conditions who oppose or are ambivalent to Theory T to 
support and pursue the conditional duties affirmed by it (‘T-duties’)—including any 
required weightings or priority-relations between T-duties.6 
2. Enabling everyone motivated by T-duties to rationally weigh their T-duties against 
nonideal costs, and different nonideal costs against each other. 
3. Enabling everyone who rationally weighs T-duties against nonideal costs to 
effectively advance their most favored weighting thereof. 
As such, the deliberative situation of the parties should be similar irrespective of which 
normative theoretical framework one plugs into the model, indexing the parties’ higher-
order interests to that model’s normative requirements.  
 One important issue here is how T-duties may constrain how the parties should 
interpret their higher-order interests. Consider luck-egalitarianism, which requires 
minimizing inequalities resulting from certain forms of luck, e.g. ‘brute bad luck’ (see Knight 
2013). If this is luck-egalitarianism’s fundamental social-political principle, the parties to a 
luck-egalitarian nonideal original position should take this T-duty to be a hard constraint 
that they cannot permissibly weigh against other things. Still, there are reasons to believe 
that within such a constraint, important further questions about nonideal fairness arise for 
luck-egalitarians. To see how, consider two principles of nonideal justice that would equally 
                                                          
6 I thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to examine these matters. 
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minimize brute bad luck—one principle that minimizes brute bad luck quickly but with 
immense immediate costs (e.g. violent revolution), and another principle that equally 
minimizes brute bad luck more slowly with less-severe momentary costs spread out over a 
much longer period of time (viz. incremental reform). Although both principles may equally 
minimize the total amount of brute bad luck in the world, there is still a further question of 
which distribution fairness requires. Finally, although luck egalitarians might attempt to 
settle this question by other means—perhaps by arguing that luck egalitarianism requires 
lowering each person’s brute bad luck below some threshold (Ibid: 930)—the nonideal 
original position provides a powerful new model for examining what fairness requires here. 
Now turn to the next step that my previous work defended in a Rawlsian context. In 
Arvan (2014: 108-14), I argued that given their three higher-order interests, the parties to a 
Rawlsian nonideal original position should seek all-purpose ‘nonideal primary goods’ for 
advancing their higher-order interests’ Are there any such goods? I argued there are, and 
will now defend additional ones, showing how the model can index them to different 
normative frameworks. 
First, I argued one nonideal primary good is the opportunity to participate effectively 
in grassroots social movements organized around Rawlsian ideals (Ibid: 108-10). This, very 
roughly, is because ‘people are power.’ If one wants to change ‘hearts and minds’ in a 
nonideal world (viz. the parties’ first higher-order interest) and advance one’s favored 
rational weightings of ideals against costs (viz. their second and third interests), one all-
purpose means is to get ‘allies’—which grassroots groups provide. Second, I argued that 
because nothing in Rawls’ ideal-theoretic machinery dealt with nonideal costs, we must use 
the nonideal original position to determine which interests of bystanders (and even 
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members of oppressing classes) are fair to be concerned with in nonideal conditions (Ibid: 
101, 104-6, 111-12). Next, I argued that because that because the parties’ higher-order 
interests are to enable anyone who has Rawlsian ideals to promote those ideals, rationally 
weigh them against costs, etc., the parties have grounds to treat a kind of qualified openness 
and inclusivity in grassroots deliberation to be a second nonideal primary good (Ibid: 111-
3). Specifically, the parties have grounds behind the veil to want grassroots deliberation to 
be open and receptive to anyone demonstrating sincere allegiance to Rawlsian ideals—
enabling any such individuals (i.e. ‘allies’) to have a say on how Rawlsian ideals are 
promoted, weighed against costs, etc. Finally, however, I argued there are also grounds for 
the parties to agree to a principle affording extra bargaining power in grassroots deliberation 
to victims of injustice in proportion to their level of oppression (Ibid: 115). This is because 
every party behind the veil knows that oppressed individuals suffer unjust deprivations—
deprivations that, given their Rawlsian ideals, the parties should want to compensate. How 
might additional bargaining power for the more oppressed be achieved in practice? In a 
number of ways, including greater proportion of more oppressed individuals in grassroots 
organizations relative to less-oppressed or non-oppressed allies; greater representation in 
leadership positions; group norms that require ‘centering’ voices of the more oppressed in 
debate and deliberation (see Goodkind and Deacon 2004); or even differential voting rights 
in the group, e.g. plural votes.7  
                                                          
7 Whether some ways of weighting bargaining power are more fair than others (or even unfair) is an important 
further issue. One possibility I intend to explore in future work is how one substantive requirement defended 
in this article—that the oppressed and their allies should seek overlapping consensus—might be used to 
evaluate the fairness of different means of weighting bargaining. 
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 Before examining other nonideal primary goods—ranging from social rights and 
duties to remedial legal, cultural, and economic goods—notice that although I developed the 
above arguments in a Rawlsian context, the parties to alternative versions of the model (e.g. 
a Nozickean version, Marxist one, etc.) have reasons to seek analogous nonideal primary 
goods. First, just as the parties to a Rawlsian nonideal original position should want to 
‘change hearts and minds’ to favor Rawlsian ideals, parties to a Nozickean nonideal original 
position should want to change hearts and minds in favor of libertarian ideals; parties to a 
Marxist version should want to change hearts and minds to favor communist ideals; etc. 
Second, just as the parties to a Rawlsian version of the model should regard open and 
inclusive Rawlsian grassroots groups as all-purpose means for advancing their higher-order 
interests, parties to a Nozickean version should regard open and inclusive libertarian groups 
as all-purpose means for doing so relative to their ideals; etc. 
Although my arguments for these ‘social’ nonideal primary goods may be debated—
and I defend additional nonideal primary goods below—the general point is that irrespective 
of which normative framework the nonideal original position is attached to, its parties have 
rational grounds to seek certain types of all-purpose goods: specifically, goods for advancing 
three higher-order interests indexed to their T-duties. Several points here are important.  
First, the ‘social’ nonideal primary goods identified so far seem independently 
attractive. Grassroots movements and deliberation have long been identified as a primary 
nexus of nonideal justice. For instance, liberals tend to identify racial and gender justice with 
the aims of various civil rights movements; Marxists tend to identify nonideal justice with 
the aims of communist revolutionary groups; libertarians with fiscally conservative 
grassroots movements (e.g. the ‘Tea Party’); etc.  
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Second, the nonideal primary goods defended so far have important normative 
implications. For example, one longstanding question of procedural fairness is whether and 
to what extent social activism should be open and inclusive. During the 1960’s Civil Rights 
Movement, whereas Martin Luther King Jr. advocated for including whites in activism—
while also calling out those who upheld injustice or stood on the sidelines (King 1963)—
many in the Black Power movement advocated against inclusivity (see Ture 1967). Similar 
debates continue today (see e.g. Desmond-Harris 2017; Pollitt 2017). Irrespective of 
whether my arguments from the model to openness and inclusivity are sound—though I 
believe they are—the more central point is that the nonideal original positions offers a 
powerful all-purpose method for rigorously investigating what fairness requires here. 
Third, the model can be used to derive procedural and substantive requirements for 
another class of social nonideal primary goods: interpersonal rights and duties. Such rights 
and duties have long been at the center of feminist theory and activism, as reflected in 
arguments for rights to freedom from epistemic injustice (see Fricker 2007; Kidd et al 2017) 
and duties to trust particular standpoints or forms of testimony (Khader 2017; McKinnon 
2017). Further, such rights and duties can clearly advance the three higher-order interests 
of the parties to the model—viz. pursuing their T-duties, enabling people to rationally weigh 
T-duties against nonideal costs, etc. However, the parties to the model should not know 
behind the veil which particular social rights and duties they favor. The reason why is simple: 
not everyone the parties represent in nonideal conditions has the same views or accepts the 
same arguments about which social rights and duties best advance their higher-order 
interests. Consequently, instead of agreeing upon a determinate list of social rights and 
duties, the parties appear to have grounds behind the veil for favoring a fair real-world 
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procedure for settling which social rights and duties people have: a procedure giving every 
individual the parties might be a fair say over which rights and duties people have. We also 
already have the beginnings of what the parties should take such a procedure to be: open 
and inclusive grassroots deliberation guided by their T-duties and affording extra bargaining 
power to the oppressed. Why? Again, because such a procedure would, if implemented, give 
every person the parties might be opportunities to have a say in activist deliberation over 
what people’s rights and duties should be, given their T-duties and nonideal costs. Finally, as 
we will now see, the parties also have grounds to favor a further substantive requirement to 
help ensure deliberation generates rights and duties fair to all. 
Recall that the parties are to deliberate behind the veil as though they could be anyone 
in nonideal conditions motivated by T-duties: not just members of oppressed populations, 
but also bystanders and sympathetic members of oppressing classes—‘allies’ to the 
oppressed who also face nonideal costs (of social reform) they would never face in ideal 
conditions. Because the parties deliberate on the assumption they could be any such 
individuals—and will not want to have their interests ignored or dominated once the veil is 
raised—the parties have grounds to want no subgroup’s interests to dominate the others. To 
be clear, the parties do have compensatory grounds to afford extra bargaining power to the 
oppressed to compensate for oppression. The point is simply that relative to that extra 
bargaining power, the parties have grounds to want deliberation to result in an overlapping 
consensus (see Rawls 1993: Part II, Lecture IV): specifically, agreements on social rights and 
duties that no one, neither the oppressed nor their allies, considers unfairly exploitive.  
Four points are important here. First, notice how well the basic procedural element 
of this account—settling social rights and duties by grassroots deliberation—coheres with 
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how activism is already widely understood. Grassroots activism, ranging from historical civil 
rights movements to #MeToo, has long focused on precisely these issues: that is, on publicly 
debating, negotiating, and enforcing which social rights and duties people have in 
combatting injustice (see e.g. Desmond-Harris 2017). Second, if I am correct, the model 
justifies important procedural and substantive constraints on activism to ensure no one is 
unfairly exploited. It requires activism to be open and inclusive to all those who demonstrate 
commitment to their T-duties, and for activism to seek consensus agreements on social 
rights and duties, albeit ones ‘tugged’ substantially in the direction of the interests of 
oppressed via extra bargaining power (viz. means outlined earlier). Third, although my 
arguments to these conclusions may be debated—raising important further questions about 
how to ensure that the interests of the oppressed are prioritized rather than displaced by 
the interests of more privileged allies (or worse)8—the most relevant point again is that the 
model provides a powerful new framework for rigorously examining what fairness requires 
here. Finally, as we will now see, the parties also have grounds to seek several additional 
nonideal primary goods: remedial legal, economic and cultural protections. 
 Consider the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, which created legal rights 
and procedures designed to correct ‘inequality of bargaining power between employees who 
do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers…’ 
(NLRA, Title 29, Ch. 7, Subchapter II U.S.C.: §151). Similarly, consider the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which created laws and procedures to protect US citizens against unfair 
discrimination. Neither Act of Congress would presumably be necessary in an ideal Rawlsian 
society that strictly complied with Rawls’ two principles of ideal justice. Instead, the NLRA 
                                                          
8 I thank Laura Kane for encouraging me to recognize these concerns.  
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and Civil Rights Act afford people remedial legal rights and opportunities—ones that serve 
to advance all three higher-order interests of the parties to a (Rawlsian) nonideal original 
position. First, the NLRA and Civil Rights Act both plausibly promote Rawlsian ideals of 
economic fairness and equal basic rights and liberties (higher-order interest 1). Second, both 
Acts created institutions—the National Labor Relations Board and US Commission on Civil 
Rights—whose roles include disseminating information about the remedial rights and 
opportunities established. Insofar as such information is an all-purpose means for people to 
rationally weigh nonideal costs against Rawlsian ideals, both Acts advance the parties’ 
second higher-order interest. Finally, the NLRA and Civil Rights Act give people all-purpose 
legal means for advancing their favored weighting of Rawlsian ideals against nonideal costs 
(higher-order interest 3). For example, the NLRA does not require people to utilize the legal 
rights and opportunities it provides. Rather, it affords all citizens legal rights and 
opportunities to pursue unionization if they judge the nonideal costs to be worth it. The Civil 
Rights Act plays similar functions for combatting unjust discrimination. Whether these 
particular Acts of Congress advance the parties’ higher-order interests better than all other 
alternative remedial legal rights requires further investigation. The relevant points for now 
are that the parties clearly should pursue some such remedial legal goods, and the model 
provides a formal framework for evaluating which remedial rights best advance the parties’ 
interests given the veil. 
These implications are important. First, they cohere with the fact that remedial legal 
rights and opportunities have been implemented in the US and elsewhere for broadly the 
reasons identified by the model. Second, the nonideal original position is a powerful model 
justifying different remedial legal rights and opportunities across different nonideal contexts 
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and ideological frameworks. For example, in previous work I suggested that parties to an 
international nonideal original position have grounds to agree upon a higher-order human 
right: very roughly, a right of oppressed peoples to collectively determine through fair 
international institutions (e.g. UN consultation) the costs they should have face for the sake 
of promoting their first-order human rights (see Arvan 2008: chs. 3-4). If correct, this could 
be an important contribution to international theory and practice—as such a right might 
serve, if embedded in international law and practice, to protect oppressed peoples against 
unfair forms of ‘humanitarian’ intervention.9 Third, as we will now see, the nonideal original 
position justifies different remedial legal rights and opportunities depending on which 
normative framework we conjoin with it.  
For example, suppose Nozickean libertarianism is correct, and we plug libertarian T-
duties into the model: duties to rectify historical injustices and respect individual liberty. 
Given these motives, the parties to a Nozickean version of the model have grounds to reject 
the National Labor Relations Act as a remedial legal right, at least in its current form. This is 
because central features of the NLRA are fundamentally inimical to respect for individual 
liberty. For one thing, the NLRA makes a majority vote to unionize legally binding on all 
employees in a bargaining unit, restricting the liberty of those who would prefer to opt out 
(NLRA: Sec. 9, § 159, a & b). Although the parties to a Nozickan nonideal original position 
might consider this restriction on liberty given their T-duty to rectify historical injustice, it 
nevertheless conflicts with their conditional T-duty to respect individual liberty. 
Consequently, the parties to the Nozickean model have grounds to consider alternatives to 
                                                          
9 Ibid: 165-6. To take one example, one of many justifications the United States gave for its 2003 invasion of 
Iraq was the right of the Iraqi people to freedom from tyranny. 
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the NLRA that might rectify injustice while better respecting liberty. One alternative might 
be a revised version of the NLRA—one creating legal rights and opportunities to unionize 
but also legal rights for individuals to opt out. Although this alternative might undermine the 
effectiveness of collective bargaining (viz. rectification), it would better respect individual 
liberty. Consequently, the parties to the Nozickean model should probably consider both 
alternatives (as well as any other relevant alternatives), and decide which to favor by 
reference to whichever decisionmaking rule—maximin or otherwise—is rational given the 
veil of ignorance. By a similar token, parties to a Marxist nonideal original position should 
presumably seek very different remedial legal rights and opportunities. Given their 
Communist ideals, they should plausibly favor something like an ‘Employee Ownership Act’ 
designed to increase worker ownership of corporations while giving people legal rights and 
opportunities to influence the nonideal costs they face in the process. 
 Finally, the parties have clear grounds to seek ‘economic and cultural’ nonideal 
primary goods—remedial policies and institutions designed to provide all-purpose cultural 
and economic support for effectively utilizing their other nonideal primary goods. One 
plausible institutional example is the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, a non-
governmental social institution that provides unjustly marginalized populations with legal, 
educational, and economic assistance in areas ranging from affirmative action to coalition 
building, policy research, voting, fair housing, and criminal justice. A plausible policy 
example is Welfare for the unemployed—which parties to a Rawlsian nonideal original 
position should presumably want to promote Rawlsian ideals (viz. fair equality of 
opportunity); parties to a Nozickean version might favor for rectification but tailor to 
libertarian ideals (viz. their T-duty to respect liberty); etc. 
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Because the creation and maintenance of remedial legal, cultural, and economic goods 
carry nonideal costs of their own, the parties to the nonideal original position should 
deliberate about these matters as well. Two obvious possibilities present themselves here. 
First, the parties might agree upon priority relations among nonideal primary goods. For 
instance, insofar as grassroots activism is an all-purpose method for individuals to influence 
the costs they should endure for creating remedial legal, economic, and cultural protections, 
the parties might favor prioritizing their social primary goods (i.e. fair grassroots 
deliberation). A second possibility is the parties might use a particular decisionmaking rule 
(e.g. maximin) to decide these matters, holding that nonideal primary goods should be 
distributed in whichever way is maximally advantageous to the most oppressed.  
Further development of these ideas must wait for another day. The point for now is 
that there are systematic reasons to believe that the nonideal original position is an 
attractive and powerful model for deriving procedural and substantive principles of 
nonideal fairness relative to whichever broader normative framework it is conjoined with. 
Conclusion 
This article argued that fairness is normatively central to nonideal theory. It then argued that 
diverse theorists have grounds to adopt a new method for investigating nonideal fairness: a 
‘nonideal original position.’ Finally, this article outlined grounds for believing the model can 
be used to derive principles of nonideal fairness indexed to different normative frameworks 
and nonideal contexts—principles that cohere with moral commonsense, the history of 
activism, and contemporary legal practice, while also promising more controversial forms of 
normative guidance. For these reasons, I submit that theorists of diverse backgrounds 
should take interest in and examine the model further in future research. 
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